On May 20, 2010, the Senate approved an extensive financial regulatory bill, while a similar bill had passed the House back in December. The bills must now be reconciled and approved by the full Congress, a process which is expected to take several weeks. Overall, the bills are broadly similar, with some important differences nonetheless. Once a single piece of legislation is crafted and agreed upon, it will be sent to the President for final approval.
The general goal of the pending legislation is to prevent a situation similar to the 2008 crisis from recurring, and to instead ensure responsibility and accountability. Authors of the legislation believe that this would be accomplished by reshaping the roles of several federal agencies and greatly augmenting the powers of the Federal Reserve so that future debacles could be pro-actively predicted and contained. The concern is that various loopholes, dependencies and watered down terms will weaken the impact of the legislation once it is finally passed. Simply put, will it have enough teeth to do the job?
For example, to address the perceived weak regulation of banks and other financial firms, the legislation would eliminate the Office of Thrift Supervision as regulator, and it would tighten oversight of large financial institutions viewed as potential threats to the system through establishment of an Office of National Insurance. A potential shortfall with this proposal is that smaller banks could still select their own regulator, which would likely be the one with the most lenient oversight.
Regarding the “too-big-to-fail” institutions (such as Lehman Brothers of the past), the government had infused billions of dollars into the largest banks to try to keep them afloat. The legislation would enable regulators to close banks whose collapse might threaten the system. The Senate bill allows regulators to decide whether to protect failed banks’ creditors. If creditors feel that they have nothing to lose in continuing to lend to weak banks, they could exacerbate the problem through over-aggressive lending and augment the costs of eventually having to shut them down. In addition, the legislation does very little to preclude big banks from growing even larger, since an amendment to the bill to limit bank size was rejected as a result of bank lobbying. As a result, the taxpayers could end up needing to foot the bill for failure again in the future.
Other hot button issues that are addressed in the financial regulatory bill include (also, see this breakdown from the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs).
- Subjecting more “exotic” instruments such as derivatives to regulations by requiring that trading take place on stock exchanges. The bill does, however, exempt companies that use derivatives to reduce the risk of fluctuations in interest rates and commodity prices. This could serve as a loophole for companies to exploit, by combining traditional business activities with purely financial investment through using derivatives.
- In order to stem risky lending to homeowners, the legislation would create a new consumer protection agency to monitor banking products and ban risky ones. However, the legislation would confine the consumer watchdog’s authority to firms with at least $10 billion in assets, leaving thousands of community banks and non-banks unsupervised.
- As far as credit rating agencies, many gave safe ratings to high-risk mortgage investments that later tanked. To try to address this weakness, the Senate bill would require an independent board, appointed by regulators, to choose rating firms, and would end the banks’ ability to select those agencies themselves. The issue is that the large ratings firms would still end up being paid by banks whose products they rate, which could influence the resulting ratings. Also, since regulators missed the warning signs leading up to the original crisis, why should we give them the keys to choose which agencies rate which financial products?
The bottom line is that even though this monumental legislation is expected to be finally completed and signed by the President very soon (possibly July 4th), it appears that the grandiose new financial rules might not be more than a paper tiger with too many loopholes to prevent another financial crisis – all bark, but no actual bite. We shall see…